A Secure and Robust Scheme for Sharing Confidential Information in IoT Systems

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Abstract

In Internet of Things (IoT) systems with security demands, there is often a need to distribute sensitive information (such as encryption keys, digital signatures, or login credentials, etc.) among the devices, so that it can be retrieved for confidential purposes at a later moment. However, this information cannot be entrusted to any one device, since the failure of that device or an attack on it will jeopardize the security of the entire network. Even if the information is divided among the devices, there is still the danger that an attackers can compromise a group of devices and expose the sensitive information. In this work, we design and implement a secure and robust scheme to enable the distribution of sensitive information in IoT networks. The proposed approach has the following two important properties (1) it uses Threshold Secret Sharing (TSS) to split the information into shares distributed among all devices in the system - and so the information can only be retrieved collaboratively by groups of devices; (2) it ensures the privacy and integrity of the information, even when attackers hijack a large number of devices and use them to collude - specifically, all the compromised devices can be identified, the confidentiality of information is kept, and authenticity of the secret can be guaranteed.

Keywords: IoT, security, secret sharing, encryption, authentication, group testing, PUF.

1. Introduction

Internet of Things (IoT) and connected devices have greatly impacted our lives. IoT systems are actively being deployed in a variety of settings, homes, hospitals, battlefields, schools, airports, manufacturing plants, just to name a few. The architecture of these systems, generally, consists of devices connected to one another or users/clients where the main network activity is data or information exchanges. Besides the general and non-sensitive information exchange such as sensor reading or air condition remote controlling, there are many instances where critical or confidential information needs to be shared or routed among the devices. This piece of information or “secret” is used by the devices or the users/clients to perform some security or privacy related functions in the IoT system. This information could be encryption keys, digital signatures, login credentials, or important account numbers, etc.

However, the secret cannot be entrusted to any individual device, because the malfunction of a single device will possibly jeopardize the security of the entire network. Therefore, an appropriate approach is to split the secret and distribute it among multiple devices. The most commonly seen technique adopted in this area is threshold secret sharing (TSS). In an IoT or distributed system, TSS is generally carried out by a dealer (usually the server or administrator of the IoT system) who takes that piece of secret, and shares it among multiple holders (the devices), in a manner that the secret can only be reconstructed collaboratively by subsets of holders whose size has to reach a minimum number. This minimum size is called “threshold”. Below the threshold, the secret is information theoretically safe and kept private from retrieval.

Practical secret sharing techniques are deployed in many real world applications including IoT systems. The most common example is the key management in wireless sensor networks. Rather than entrusting the cryptographic key to a single node, which can be easily compromised in hostile environments, the key is shared to a group of nodes and can only be retrieved collaboratively [Chadha et al. (2005)] to be used for digital signature or other cryptographic purposes at the other terminal. If some nodes are found to be malfunctional, then they will be revoked and replaced by the same number of healthy nodes to reach the threshold. The “Vanish” project [Geambasu et al. (2009)] uses the threshold property to make the secret key in a distributed system vanish when the number of shareholding nodes gradually decrease to below the threshold. Another application is in Hardware Security Module (HSM) based systems. HSMs are used in bank card payment systems. Some HSMs [Thales (2013)] are produced and distributed by certification authorities (CAs) and registration authorities (RAs) to generate and share important secret keys under Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). These HSMs also require implementation of a multi-part user authentication scheme, namely threshold secret sharing. The most well-known application is probably the DNS Security (DNSSEC) [Able (2010)] which ensures the DNS (Domain Name System) servers to connect the users and their Internet destinations (URLs and IPs) in a secure and verified manner, has its root key split and shared among seven holders all over the world. In the case of an attack, if any five or more of the holders are able to come to an U.S. base, then they can reconstruct the root key using their shares to restore the Internet connections. Technology survey companies also use TSS to store sensitive survey data to prevent them from being extracted by any single data analyst without the participation of others [Lapets et al. (2016)].
However, although this technique reduces the risk of losing all the confidential information under the malfunction of one of a few devices, there is still a danger when attackers compromise a larger group of them. Due to this distributed nature, TSS schemes are susceptible to a number of attacks, like, passive attacks, man-in-the-middle (MITM) or share manipulations, i.e., cheating. These attacks, resulting in share disclosure or distortions, may lead to the leakage of the original secret or retrieval of a wrong secret. Generally speaking, the TSS is able to maintain the privacy of the secret information under the existence of a small number (below the threshold) of cheaters. It alone does not guarantee the integrity of the secret.

Although, there have been many secure TSS schemes, they are often limited in their adversarial capabilities, i.e., cheater tolerance. For instance, [Cramer et al. (2008)] proposed a secure version of TSS based on secret validation, which is able to detect but not identify any number of cheaters. [Wang et al. (2008)] on the other hand leveraged the superimposed codes with secret verification and were able to locate no more than $n^{0.5}$ cheaters, where $n$ is the total number of devices involved. However, when the number of cheaters exceeds their fault tolerance, neither the privacy or the integrity of the secret can be guaranteed. In addition, the dishonest parties can even frame up the honest ones as cheaters.

Therefore, we propose a secure and robust scheme to enable the sharing of the confidential information in IoT systems with a stronger cheater tolerance. The major contributions of this work are:

1. The proposed approach uses Threshold Secret Sharing (TSS) to split the secret into shares distributed among the devices in the system and so the secret can only be retrieved collaboratively by groups of devices;

2. It adds additional security features on top of the original TSS functionality, specifically, it protects the confidentiality of the secret even when attackers have hijacked a group of devices;

3. It also ensures the integrity of the secret even when attackers hijack a large number of devices, or collide, or manipulate the shares to forge fake secrets;

4. The proposed approach is able to detect and identify cheaters or compromised share holders up to a given theoretical upper bound;

5. An automation tool is provided to aid in secret sharing procedure and system programming based on user-specified parameters.

For the feasibility evaluation of the proposed robust secret sharing approach in systems consisting of physically distributed and connected devices, we introduce the Odysseus IoT open-interface testbed system. Testing on the Odysseus IoT testbed serves to validate the practicality of the attack models and associated defenses. It also highlights how one may implement a practical secure information sharing mechanism.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the details of the Odysseus IoT testbed system, as well as the original threshold secret sharing scheme. The section also covers the attack model. Section III summarizes some existing secure protocols for the TSS. Section IV follows up with their vulnerabilities under the attack model. Section V describes the proposed secure and robust secret sharing scheme, as well as a cheater identification protocol. Section VI presents the design automation tool, and finally, Section VII concludes the paper.

2. The Odysseus IoT System, the Original Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme, and the Attack Models

In this section, we first introduce the Internet of Things (IoT) Testbed System named “Odysseus”, on which we evaluate the practicality of the proposed secure TSS scheme. Without loss of generality and to provide some deployment concreteness, we introduce and illustrate the proposed approach in the context of the Odysseus system.

2.1. System Model - Odysseus IoT

The original motivation of developing a secure and robust TSS is to protect systems like the Odysseus IoT system. In the Odysseus, the dealer is the service provider who provides the Odysseus boards and is responsible for the deployment. The Odysseus boards are sensor hosting boards supporting various types of sensors. It also has wireless communication modules for data exchange. The clients, either individuals or corporations, can pick whichever sensors to be installed to the boards via GPIO ports before the boards’ deployment. These sensors can either be heterogeneous or homogeneous. An example of Odysseus’ application is fire-fighting and rescue: heat sensors to map the fire intensity and locations in a building, and motion sensors to identify human presence.

The dealer (administrator) of the Odysseus system will deploy to a region a large number of sensor boards, and their sensor data can be requested remotely by different clients. From time to time, a client will request sensing data from a group of sensors, while retrieving from them a secret if necessary. The secret, such as an encryption key, a signature, or a login credential etc., will be used by the client on various applications associated with the sensor data. The system chart and prototype of Odysseus are shown below in Fig. 1 and 2.

The security issue of this IoT system also needs to be addressed. Although the dealer and clients alone can be trusted, the sensor hosting boards scattered all over a region are not physically monitored. Since any number of them can be subject to passive or active attacks, no critical information such as the secret should be entrusted to any individual board. There is even a danger of a large amount of them being hijacked by the attackers, meaning the adversary can gain full access to those devices. Therefore there is a demand of a secure protocol to attain the privacy and integrity of the secret, as well as error tolerance under the existence of compromised boards.
2.2. The Original Threshold Secret Sharing

Due to the distributed nature of Odysseus (and other IoT networks), there is often a demand to split the confidential information among the devices instead of entrusting the whole secret to every individual, such that the defect of a single device will not harm the security of the entire network.

The following notations are used to describe and evaluate the original threshold secret sharing scheme, as well as the related secure variations:

- $S$: the original secret (a piece of confidential information);
- $D_i$: the public ID of the $i^{th}$ shareholder;
- $h_i$: the share of $S$ to the $i^{th}$ shareholder;
- $t$: the threshold of a secret sharing scheme;
- $c_{est}$: the number of estimated cheaters;
- $c_{act}$: the number of actual cheaters;
- $n$: the total number of shareholders involved in a computation;
- $b$: the number of bits in a vector variable;
- $\oplus$: the addition operator in finite fields;
- $\cdot$: the multiplication operator in finite fields;
- $\oplus$: the cumulative sum operator in finite fields;
- $\prod$: the cumulative product operator in finite fields;
- $\sim$: the tilde symbol, indicating the distortion of a vector;
- $MAC()$: a secure message authenticating function;
- $ENC()$: a cryptographic encryption function;
- $EtM()$: an Encrypt-then-MAC function;
- $K$: the cryptographic key;
- $||$: the concatenation operator;
- $E$: the encoded secret where $E = EtM(S, K)$;
- $\sim$: the vector distortion symbol;
- $P_{miss}$: the probability of failing to detect the conduct of cheating in an IoT system.

The concept of $t$-threshold secret sharing (TSS) was first introduced by Shamir [Shamir (1979)] in 1979. All the computations should be carried out over Galois finite field (GF) arithmetic in order to maintain the information theoretic security. To share a secret $S$, a polynomial of degree $(t − 1)$ is used to compute and distribute the shares, where the secret $S$ serves as the free or leading coefficient, and all other coefficients can be arbitrarily chosen. The shares are the evaluations of the polynomial by each holder’s $D_i$.

The share distribution equations when $S$ is placed as the free coefficients is:

$$h_i = S \oplus a_1 D_i \oplus a_2 D_i^2 \oplus \cdots \oplus a_{t−1} D_i^{t−1}.$$  

And as the leading coefficient:

$$h_i = a_0 \oplus a_1 D_i \oplus a_2 D_i^2 \oplus \cdots \oplus S D_i^{t−1}.$$  

where $S, h_i, D_i \in GF(2^b)$.

The ID number $D$ is publicly known to everyone while the share $h$ are kept private by each shareholder.

With any subset of at least $t$ shareholders’ IDs and shares, one can use the Lagrange interpolation formula to reconstruct the secret.

If $S$ is placed at the free coefficient, it can be retrieved by:

$$S = \bigoplus_{i=0}^{t−1} \frac{D_i \cdot h_i}{\prod_{j=0, j\neq i}^{t−1} (D_i \oplus D_j)}.$$  

If $S$ is the leading coefficient, it can be retrieved by:

$$S = \bigoplus_{i=0}^{t−1} \frac{h_i}{\prod_{j=0, j\neq i}^{t−1} (D_i \oplus D_j)}.$$  

Such a construction is $(t-1)$-private. This means it needs at least $t$ shareholders to reconstruct the secret and so any $(t-1)$ or less shareholders have zero knowledge of the secret.

For computation simplicity, in this paper we choose to place $S$ as the leading coefficient as shown in [Eq. 1 and 2]. We also assume that the system works over finite field $GF(2^b)$, where in most computer systems, $b = 32, 64, 128, 256, \cdots$.

The original scheme’s share distribution and secret reconstruction procedures are shown in Fig. 3, which matches with the Odysseus and many other IoT architectures very well in the administrator - devices - clients three layer structure.
Remark 2.1. Shamir’s secret sharing scheme is supposed to work under finite field arithmetic where the field size should be a prime or power of prime. Ordinary arithmetic will be vulnerable and any secret can be retrieved by at most two carefully selected shareholders instead of $t$.

In the ordinary positive integer arithmetic, for instance, if a shareholder’s ID is $D_i = 1$, and so this holder’s share will be $h_i = a_0 + a_1 + \ldots + S$, namely the sum of the all coefficients of (1). And in the ordinary arithmetic it is obvious that $h_i > a_l a_j \in \{a_0, a_1, \ldots, S\}$. Then this holder can find another holder with ID $D_j \geq h_i$ whose share is $h_j$. If these two shareholders collude they will easily get the secret regardless of the $t$ by expressing $h_j$ in the radix of $D_j$, where the most significant digit will be $S$.

However, in finite field or modular arithmetic, one can never have $h_i > a_l a_j \in \{a_0, a_1, \ldots, S\}$ if $h_i = a_0 \oplus a_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus S$.  

2.3. Attack Model

We define the attack model below which is much stronger than what the original scheme and its conventional secure variations can deal with.

Definition 2.1. The attack model in this paper is described by the following characters:

1. The dealer and the clients are trusted;
2. The shareholders (devices in an IoT system) are not trusted and there is no limit to the number of compromised devices or cheaters.
3. The cheaters are able to gain full control of the hijacked devices, meaning to read its memories, IO ports, or to tamper them.
4. The cheaters can also eavesdrop or tamper the communication channels between devices, and dealer and clients.
5. The attackers have the knowledge of the system’s basic parameters $(n, t, d)$ etc.). They can work collaboratively.
6. The goals of the attackers are:
   a) *Passive attack*: to stealthily compute and acquire the original secret;
   b) *Active attack*: to select their own secret and submit it to the clients without being spotted.

Note: Besides the shares, each Odysseus boards also submits their sensor data to the clients. However, those are the source data and their verification is another issue beyond the scope of this paper.

When the cheaters work collusively, they are able to share any information they hold, or to modify it according to their common interest. We also assume that the cheaters have sufficient computation power to calculate equations such as [1, 2] and other necessary tasks.

3. The Conventional Secure Protocols for TSS

In this section, we present some of the existing secure protocols and their associated passive and active attack models. We also highlight their vulnerabilities under our attack model.

3.1. Against Passive Attacks

The property of TSS only allows $t$ or more shareholders (devices) to retrieve the secret. Below this threshold the secret is information theoretical secure. Namely, $t-1$ devices have no more knowledge of the secret than any individual device does. However, if the cheaters have compromised $t$ or more devices, which is $c_{act} \geq t$, then the privacy of the secret is not guaranteed, since they can use [Eq. 2] to retrieve it.

3.2. Against Active Attacks

Soon after the introduction of the Shamir’s secret sharing scheme, it was noticed that if any number of the shareholders participating in the secret reconstruction apply an active attack by changing their shares to make $h_i$ to $\tilde{h}_i \neq h_i$, the retrieved secret will be distorted $\tilde{S} \neq S$ according to [Eq. 2]. Therefore the authenticity of the submitted shares or the retrieved secret needs to be verified.

3.2.1. Share Verification

Researchers [McEliece et al. (1981); Gennaro et al. (2001); Fitzi et al. (2006)] have proposed approaches to verify the validity of shares with a probability of 1. The common feature in the latter approaches is that, if the shares can be encoded to a codeword of a certain error control code (ECC), then the codeword’s symbols (shares) can be verified and corrected within the ECC’s capability.

Particularly, the share distribution [Eq. 1] is inherently equivalent to the non-systematic encoding equation of the well-known Reed-Solomon (RS) ECC codes. RS codes are maximum distance separable (MDS) codes which meet the Singleton bound with equality. With such a distribution equation, an $(n, t, d)$ Reed-Solomon codeword $(h_0, h_1, \ldots, h_{n-1})$ is encoded with $n$ symbols (shares) in total, $t$ information symbols, and distance $d = n - t + 1$ which corrects up to $\frac{d-1}{2}$ (or $\frac{n-t}{2}$) erroneous symbols with algorithms in [Berlekamp et al. (2015); Gao (2003)].

In the secret sharing language, with $n$ shareholders’ IDs and shares, we are able to tolerate up to $c_{act} \leq \frac{n-1}{2}$ shares maliciously modified by cheaters. Theoretically speaking, the error correction capability of RS codes can tolerate up to $c_{act} < n/2$.
cheaters if \( n \gg t \). However, oftentimes an assumption is made that there should be \( c_{\text{est}} < t \) cheaters such that a group of all cheaters have no access to the secret [Krawczyk (1993)]. Then we have:

\[
c_{\text{est}} < n/3.
\]

(3)

If \( n \) instead of \( t \) shareholders are involved in the share error correction by RS decoders, then the correctness of the retrieved secret is ensured when [Eq. 3] holds. Consequently, the secure secret sharing is both \((t-1)\)-private and \((t-1)\)-resilient, that up to \( t-1 \) shareholders cannot reconstruct the secret, and up to \( t-1 \) cheaters cannot affect the correctness of the secret [Liu et al. (2015)].

3.2.2. Secret Verification

Besides share verification with share correction probability of 1, another approach is to sign the original secret with a key \( K \) using a message authentication code (MAC) function. Then the original secret is shared together with its MAC (usually in a manner of concatenation) to the holders. Denoting the encoded secret as \((S||MAC(K,S))\), then [Eq. 1] becomes:

\[
h_i = a_0 \oplus a_1 D_i \oplus a_2 D_i^2 \oplus \cdots \oplus (S||MAC(K,S))D_i^{D_i-1}.
\]

(4)

At the reconstructor end, after the retrieval of the possibly distorted \((S||MAC(K,S))\), the following authentication equation is evaluated:

\[
MAC(\tilde{K},\tilde{S}) = MAC(K,S).
\]

(5)

An inequality indicates the detection of cheating. If this MAC function has a high enough security level, such as \( 2^{128} \) (or lower) collision or mis-detection probability, then it is generally believed that all distortions will be spotted. The secure protocol of the Shamir’s secret sharing is shown below.

![Secret Sharing Protocol](image)

Figure 4: The secret sharing scheme with secret authentication in the context of Odysseus system.

There are two common approaches for signing the original secret: HMAC with a key, and AMD codes with a random vector.

A. HMAC with a Key.

HMAC, keyed-hashing for message authentication code, is the most often used technique for authentication nowadays. To sign a secret \( S \), the nested equation is defined as follows [Krawczyk et al. (1997)]:

\[
\text{Definition 3.1.} \quad \text{Let } HMAC() \text{ be the HMAC function, } K \text{ the signing key, and } K' \text{ be derived from } K \text{ by padding to the right zeros to the block size. Also let } H \text{ be a hashing function, opad the outer padding and ipad the inner padding. Then:}

\[
HMAC(K,S) = H((K' \oplus \text{opad})||H((K' \oplus \text{ipad})||S))
\]

(6)

The client can authenticate the secret using the HMAC version of [Eq. 5]:

\[
HMAC(\tilde{K},\tilde{S}) = HMAC(K,S).
\]

(7)

With SHA-2 256 or higher used for \( H() \) [Hansen et al. (2011)], the collision rate is less than \( 2^{-128} \) and considered cryptographically secure.

B. AMD with a Random Number.

[Cramer et al. (2008)] have proposed an Algebraic Manipulation Detection (AMD) code to detect any modification of secrets with a probability close to 1. [Wang et al. (2011)] later generalized this code with a flexible construction.

Unlike HMAC, it operates over finite fields and its security level is adjustable by block size \( b \). The AMD encoding is defined as follows:

\[
\text{Definition 3.2.} \quad \text{Let } K = (K_1, K_2, \cdots, K_m), \text{ where } K_i \in GF(2^b) \text{ is a randomly generated } b \text{-bit vector. An } g^b \text{-order Generalized Reed-Muller code (GRM) with } m \text{ variables consists of all codewords } \{f(0), f(1), \cdots, f(2^{mb} - 1)\}, \text{ where } f(K) \text{ is a polynomial of } K = (K_1, K_2, \cdots, K_m) \text{ of degree up to } g. \text{ Let}

\[
A(K) = \begin{cases} 
\bigoplus_{i=1}^m K_i^{g^i}, & \text{if } g \text{ is odd; } \\
\bigoplus_{i=1}^{m-1} K_i^{g^i + 1}, & \text{if } g \text{ is even and } m > 1;
\end{cases}
\]

where \( \bigoplus \) is the accumulated sum in \( GF(2^b) \).}

(6)

Let \( f(K,S) = A(K) \oplus B(K,S) \), then a generalized AMD codeword is composed of the vectors \((S, K, f(K,S))\), where \( S \) is the information portion, \( K \) the random vector, and \( f(K,S) \) the redundancy signature portion [Wang et al. (2011)].

\[
\text{Remark 3.1.} \quad \text{If the attack involves a non-zero error on the information } S, \text{ which is the major purpose of almost all attacks, then in } f(K,S) \text{ the term } A(K) \text{ can be omitted [Bu et al. (2017)]. Further more, if only one random number vector is used, the encoding equation can be further more simplified to:}

\[
AMD(K,S) = f(K,S) = \bigoplus_{1 \leq j_1, j_2, \cdots, j_b \leq b+1} S_{j_1, j_2, \cdots, j_b} K_j^{h_j}
\]

(8)
where $S_j$ is a $b$-bit block of $S$.

The client can authenticate the secret using the AMD version of [Eq. 5]:

$$AMD(\hat{K}, \hat{S}) = AMD(\hat{K}, S).$$

The probability of mis-detecting a distortion of $S$ in [Eq. 9] is upper bounded by $\frac{g}{2^n}$ [Cramer et al. (2008)], where $g$ usually is a very small number in most constructions. With $b$ selected to be 128 bits or larger, the security level of AMD codes will be in the same order of HMAC ($2^{-128}$ or less in attack mis-detection rate).

Note: Although HMAC and AMD codes are different approaches for authenticating the retrieved secrets, there is no essential difference in their design philosophy as [Eq. 7] and [Eq. 9] have shown.

It should be noted that there are two potential drawbacks on the secret verification approach. Firstly, in the previous works there was no explanation on how to transmit the MAC key $K$ from the dealer to the client. Secondly, with this approach alone it can only detect the distortion of the secret, but not identify the cheaters nor retrieve the correct secret.

4. Vulnerabilities of the Conventional Secure TSS Schemes

In this section, we illustrate the vulnerabilities associated with conventional secure schemes under the attack model defined previously. Because of the distributed nature of IoT systems, it is not unusually to have unexpected scale of attacks beyond the estimation. The demand of a more secure and robust confidential information sharing scheme for IoT systems is the main motivation for the approach proposed in the next section.

4.1. Passive Attack: Acquiring the Original Secret

Usually an assumption has to be made that $c_{\text{est}} < t$ so that a group of all cheaters cannot retrieve the secret by themselves. However, it could happen that there exists more than estimated cheaters such that $c_{\text{act}} \geq t > c_{\text{est}}$. With any $t$ of them it is easy to acquire the original secret by [Eq. 2].

4.2. Active Attack: Making the Secret Unaccessible

Here we assume the IoT system’s TSS is already equipped with the share verification module. As mentioned in Section 3.2.1, the essence of such module is to encode the shares into a codeword, whose validity can be verified by the RS decoding algorithm. Although RS codes are known for their strong error correction (tolerating $c_{\text{est}} < n/3$ cheaters), their encoding procedure is linear and susceptible to cheating exploits.

If the number of cheaters satisfy $(n/3 < c_{\text{act}} < n - t + 1)$, although the RS decoder can still raise an alarm for cheating, it is already beyond the share error correction capability of the RS code. Therefore the system is unable to retrieve the secret or identify the cheaters.

4.3. Active Attack: Forging a Legal Secret

If the number of cheaters satisfies $n - t + 1 \leq c_{\text{act}} \leq n$, they will be able to manipulate the entire system. For instance the cheaters can pick another share distribution polynomial different from [Eq. 1] with random coefficients $b_i$ and their own forged secret $\hat{S}$:

$$h'_i = b_0 \oplus h_iD_i \oplus b_2D_i^2 \oplus \cdots \oplus \hat{S}D_i^{-1}$$

The new shares $h'_i$ of the cheaters will be the evaluation of [Eq. 10] by the same IDs $D_i$. When $c_{\text{act}} \geq n - t + 1$, the cheaters’ shares will form a new legal RS codeword which will never be detected by the RS decoder. The secret reconstruction will then submit to the client the secret $\hat{S}$ that the cheaters have selected. If the client uses it on his/her own important applications such as digital signatures. For the attackers, who have selected $\hat{S}$ themselves, it will be effortless to break those applications.

Example 4.1. A secret sharing system has a secret $S = 111$ in the $GF(2^3)$ finite field. It requires $t = 2$ shareholders to reconstruct the secret every time. The following share distribution polynomial is used to generate the shares:

$$h_i = a_0 \oplus S D_i = 010 \oplus 111 D_i.$$  

The protocol is designed in such a way that up to 1 cheater can be tolerated. Therefore, in the secret reconstruction stage there will be $n = 3c_{\text{est}} + 1 = 4$ shareholders involved. Suppose that in the secret reconstruction, shareholders with IDs $D_0 = 001$, $D_1 = 010$, $D_2 = 011$, $D_3 = 100$ are involved. And the shares distributed to them are $h_0 = 101$, $h_1 = 111$, $h_2 = 010$, $h_3 = 001$. These 4 shares form a legal RS codeword $\nu = (101, 111, 010, 001)$ with distance $d = n - t + 1 = 3$ and it can correct up to 1 error. Now all 4 of them are cheating collusively, and they have selected their own secret $\hat{S} = 100$ and a different share distribution polynomial:

$$h'_i = b_0 \oplus \hat{S} D_i = 001 \oplus 100 D_i.$$  

Thus their shares will be maliciously changed to $h_0 = 101$, $h_1 = 010$, $h_2 = 110$, $h_3 = 111$, which is also a legal codeword $\nu' = (101, 010, 110, 111)$ of a $(n, t, d) = (4, 2, 3)$ RS code. This codeword will unfortunately be considered as a valid codeword by the RS decoding algorithm [Gao (2003)] and there will be no cheating alarm. As a result, the fake secret $\hat{S} = 100$ is retrieved by those shares under [Eq. 2]. During the entire procedure the cheating will not be detected.

4.4. Active Attack: Framing Up the Honest Shareholders

Another vulnerability that cheaters can exploit when $(n - t + 1 \leq c_{\text{act}} \leq n)$ is to frame up the honest shareholders, so that the decoder treats the honest parties as “cheaters” and cheaters as “honest shareholders”. If $c_{\text{act}}$ is large enough that the number of honest shareholders is $n - c_{\text{act}} \leq \frac{2t}{3}$, then the honest shareholders are within the RS decoder’s error correction capability. Since all cheaters’ shares are generated by the same forged secret sharing polynomial, the honest minority will be treated as
cheaters and “corrected”. The cheaters’ fake secret will be regarded as the valid secret as the result of [Eq. 2].

**Example 4.2.** Suppose that we have the same secret sharing system as in Example 4.1. Let us have three shareholders \( \{ D_0 = 001, D_1 = 010, D_2 = 011 \} \) as cheaters, and shareholder \( D_3 = 100 \) is an honest participant. The codeword for the shares submitted to the RS decoder will be \( \nu' = (101, 010, 110, 001) \), \( \nu' \) will be decoded as \( (101, 010, 110, 111) \) which is the cheaters’ codeword. Shareholder \( D_3 = 100 \) will be labeled as a “cheater”. Consequently, the forged secret \( S = 100 \) (as in Example 4.1) will be retrieved.

4.5. Active Attack: Against Secret Verification

As mentioned above, one can design an IoT with secret verification TSS capabilities. Although, such a design has a high probability of detecting any number of share distortions, it alone is not able to identify the cheaters nor correct the shares. In addition, there is one more problem that has to be addressed: how to securely pass the MAC key \( K \) from the dealer to the client (as in Fig. 4) in order to conduct the secret authentication, giving that the transmission channel might be eavesdropped.

There can be more types of attacks besides the ones listed above. Especially, when the number of cheaters is beyond estimation, the entire system can be subject to total manipulation. Therefore, there is a demand for a more secure and resilient scheme to handle the severe attacks.

5. A Secure and Robust Secret Sharing Scheme for IoT

In this section, we propose a new secure and robust secret sharing scheme for IoT systems. Comparing with the current secret sharing scheme which has limited protection against the cheaters, the advantages of the proposed scheme are:

1. The proposed scheme protects both the confidentiality and the integrity of the secret;

2. The proposed scheme is able to detect and identify the cheaters up to the theoretical upper bound;

3. The proposed scheme uses the Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF) to ensure the security of the cryptographic key update;

4. The proposed scheme works in an adaptive manner, that a more powerful module will only be activated when the previous module fails. Thus the scheme functions in a cost-efficient way and consumes minimum resource in average.

The following subsections are organized in the order of: overview of the proposed scheme, detailed introduction of the modules of this scheme, and finally a simple numeric example to demonstrate the scheme.

5.1. Overview of the Proposed Secure Secret Sharing Scheme

The proposed scheme has four stages to ensure the basic functionality and authenticity of the secret sharing.

**Stage 1: Dealer - Encoding and Distribution of the Secret**
Firstly, the dealer will encode the secret \( S \) with an Encryption-then-MAC function \( EtM() \) to \( E = EtM(K, S) \), where \( K \) is randomly picked from the dealer’s repository, which stores the challenge and response pairs (CRPs) of the client’s PUF. Then the dealer distributes \( E \) using [Eq. 2] to \( n \) shareholders. The detailed key transmission protocol will be introduced in the following subsections.

**Stage 2: Client - Secret Retrieving**
The client will select an arbitrary set of \( t \) shareholders to participate in the secret retrieving using [Eq. 2]. The retrieved secret will be authenticated by [Eq. 7 or 9] by the \( K \) generated at the client end. If the authentication claims validity of the secret, then it is considered a successful secret reconstruction with no cheat. If not, the scheme calls for Stage 3 for share correction.

**Stage 3: Client - Share Error Correction**
This stage uses the Reed-Solomon error correction module in the classic protocol. Here, \( n = 3c_{est} + 1 \) shareholders will be invited to participate in the protocol, where \( c_{est} \) is the number of estimated cheaters defined by the system. The RS decoder will try to correct the shares and then send them back to the secret reconstruction and verification modules at the client end. If it passes both the share correction (by RS decoder module) and secret verification (by authentication module), then the secret reconstruction is successful. When \( c_{est} < n/3 \), the secret tolerance probability is 100%. If either module fails then the protocol ascends to its fourth stage, indicating that the actual number of cheaters is greater than \( n/3 \).

**Stage 4: Client - Group Testing**
This stage will be activated if the previously retrieved secret is not legal. It will involve up to \( n \) shareholders, among whom there are at least \( n/3 \) honest clients. The client will generate a group testing pattern which is able to identify up to \( c_{est} = n-t \) cheaters with a minimum number of \( t \) honest holders. Even if there are more than \( n-t \) cheaters, it is still able to detect the cheating, although the correct secret is beyond reconstruction because of not enough honest holders.

The work flow of the proposed scheme is shown below.

5.2. Secret Encoding

In order to perform obfuscation and authentication of the secret, we will apply the Encryption-then-MAC function to encode the original secret \( S \) to \( E = EtM(K,S) = ENC(K,S)||MAC(K,ENC(K,S)) \). The encryption function \( ENC() \) can be the standard AES or other lightweight approaches. And the \( MAC() \) function can be either HMAC with fixed security level \( P_{miss} \), or AMD codes with flexible \( P_{miss} \) as mentioned in Section 3.2.1. AMD codes are able to trade off between the security level and hardware cost by adjusting the vector size \( b \), which can be an ideal choice for IoT systems with limited resources.

For some distributed systems without a client end, it is not possible to maintain the confidentiality of the secret if there are
to be in 2002 [Gassend et al. (2002)]. A PUF is a piece of hardware that produces unpredictable responses upon challenges due to their manufacturing variations. PUF has the property of easy to make and hard to duplicate, even under exact the same circuit layout and manufacturing procedures. A PUF can be made from a device’s (either ASIC or FPGA) memory cells or circuits without modifying the device’s architecture. Because of its attributions of randomness and uniqueness, PUF provides an inexpensive and integrated solution for random number or secret key generation, dynamic authentication, and identification [Yu et al. (2016)].

The PUF serves as a cryptographic primitive in a manner of challenge-response pairs (CRPs). Each PUF’s output (response) is a non-linear function of the outside input (challenge) and the PUFs own physical, intrinsic, and unique diversity, in another word, “Silicon Fingerprints” [Times (2010)]. Given the same challenge, the same PUF design on different circuits will make from a device’s (either ASIC or FPGA) memory cells or circuits without modifying the device’s architecture. The PUF serves as a cryptographic primitive in a manner of challenge-response pairs (CRPs). Each PUF’s output (response) is a non-linear function of the outside input (challenge) and the PUFs own physical, intrinsic, and unique diversity, in another word, “Silicon Fingerprints” [Times (2010)]. Given the same challenge, the same PUF design on different circuits will return different responses, which cannot be predicted by just having the challenge vector. Therefore PUF is an ideal choice in facilitating the transmission of $K$.

### 5.3.1. Key Transmission Protocol

**Algorithm 5.1.** For the $k^{th}$ round of secret sharing, denote the secret as $S_k$, the arbitrarily selected challenge and response of the client’s PUF as $CHL_k$ and $K_k$ respectively. Then the EtM key $K$ is transmitted from the dealer to the client as follows:

1. When a client registers to the dealer, the dealer challenges the client’s intrinsic PUF with a set of inputs and stores its CRPs;
2. Before $S_k$ is to be distributed, the dealer selects an arbitrary CRP and uses its response $K_k$ to encode the secret with $EtM()$ to $E_k$. At the same time, the challenge $CHL_k$ takes the position of the share distribution polynomial’s free coefficient. Therefore [Eq. 1] becomes:

$$h_j = CHL_k \oplus a_1D_i \oplus a_2D_i^2 \oplus \cdots \oplus E_2D_i^{-1}. \quad (11)$$

Then the encoded secret $E_k$ is distributed in the form of shares to the devices of the IoT system;
3. When $S_k$ needs to be retrieved, $t$ holders will turn in their IDs and shares to the client;
4. The client uses [Eq. 2] to retrieve the encoded secret $E_k$, and by another Lagrange interpolation formula the client calculates $CHL_k$:

$$CHL_k = \sum_{j=0}^{r-1} D_i \cdot h_j \prod_{j=0, j \neq i}^{r-1} (D_i \oplus D_j). \quad (12)$$

5. The client takes $CHL_k$ to its PUF and regenerates the corresponding response $K_k$, which is the same key used by dealer to EtM $S_k$. This $K_k$ is used to authenticate and decrypt the retrieved encoded secret $E_k$.

Now the Odysseus system (or other IoT systems) equipped with the proposed scheme will have the following work flow:
5.3.2. The Selection of PUFs for Secret Sharing

Based on where the variation comes from, there are multiple types of PUFs. Delay PUFs and memory PUFs are the two popular implementations. Delay PUF uses the random variation in delays of wires and gates, and their race condition to generate the response bits. Memory PUF is based on the random initial state (1 or 0) of each memory cell.

Based on the size of the challenge-response pairs, there are weak and strong PUFs, which have different applications in security. Weak PUFs’ CRP size grows linearly with the PUF size, while strong PUFs’ CRPs exponentially.

In our design we consider the frequent updates of the key (up to one key per secret). Thus we have selected the delay PUFs because of their large sets of CRPs. In our design we use FGAs to implement the secret sharing system with both the Ring Oscillator (RO) PUF based on the race condition of two ROs, and the Arbiter PUF based on the delay difference between two MUX chains [Morozov et al. (2010)]. We also improved the design of both to increase the Hamming distance among the responses, while developing a design automation tool (introduced in Section 6).

5.4. Cheater Identification by Group Testing

In Section 3.2.2 we have pointed it that the secret verification alone does not identify the cheaters nor help to retrieve the correct secret. Therefore in this paper we propose an adaptive group testing which works together with secret verification for cheater identification. It can locate up to \( c_{est} = n - t \) number of cheaters, which is the theoretical upper bound. Meaning in a \( t \)-threshold secret sharing scheme, among all the \( n \) shareholders participating in our scheme, our scheme only needs as few as only \( t \) honest parties to retrieve the correct secret. The test construction is as follows.

**Construction 5.1.** For any \( t \)-threshold secret sharing scheme, suppose there are \( n \) holders there are \( c \) attackers where \( 0 \leq c \leq n - t \). A test pattern to identify the honest holders and attackers can be constructed as a binary matrix \( M \) of size \( T \times n \), where \( T \) is the number of tests needed at most. The rows of \( M \) consist of all different \( n \)-bit vectors with exactly \( t \) 1’s and so \( \frac{n}{t} = \binom{n}{t} \). Each column of the matrix therefore has \( \binom{n}{t} \) number of 1’s. The 1’s in each row (test) correspond to the shareholders participating in that particular test. Each test is a two-step procedure:

1. A secret reconstruction using [Eq. 2] to retrieve the secret \( \tilde{E} \) with its specific participants;
2. An authentication using [Eq. 7 or 9] over \( \tilde{E} \) to verify the validity of the retrieved secret.

Then the cheater identification algorithm is:

**Algorithm 5.2.** For any \( t \)-threshold secret sharing scheme and its corresponding group testing matrix \( M \) there are \( n \) shareholders participating in the tests indexed by \( H = \{0, 1, 2, \cdots, n - 1\} \). Among the \( n \) shareholders there are \( c_{est} \) cheaters where \( n/3 \leq c_{est} \leq n - t \). Let \( w = (w_0, w_1, \cdots, w_{n-1}) \) be a \( n \)-digit vector and \( w = u^\top M \), where \( u \) is the \( T \)-bit binary test syndrome and \( x \) is the multiplication of regular arithmetic. The cheaters’ indexes belong to the set \( \{l| w_l = \binom{n}{t-1} \} \), and the rest of the holders are honest.

However, the testing technique above requires \( \binom{n}{t} \) tests in total to identify the cheaters. This can be a large number when \( n \) and \( t \) are large. Therefore its adaptive form is given below which drastically reduces the average number of tests to a linear formula.

**Algorithm 5.3.** For a test pattern \( M \) of size \( T \times n \) generated by Construction 5.1, \( \Delta T \) is the number of tests needed to find the first 0 (equality of [Eq. 7 or 9]) in the test syndrome. The \( n \) shareholders are indexed by \( H = \{0, 1, 2, \cdots, n - 1\} \). The \( t \) honest holders identified by this test are indexed by \( I = \{i_0, i_1, \cdots, i_{t-1}\} \). The system only needs to run at most \( n - t \) more tests whose participants are \( \{i_0, i_1, \cdots, i_{t-2}, j\} \), where \( j \in H \backslash I \). Each test’s syndrome indicates holder \( j \) as an attacker or not by 1 or 0. The total number of tests needed to identify all holders is then at most \( \Delta T + (n - t) \).

5.5. Extra Invitation Module

If the group testing module in Stage 4 cannot successfully identify the \( c_{act} \) cheaters in the system, where \( n - t < c_{act} \leq n \), then the number of honest shareholders is less than \( t \).

At this point, our scheme will still raise the cheating alarm based on the secret authentication. Moreover, the protocol is adaptive enough to be extended to a further stage to include an invitation module. This module can pull in the execution additional participants and perform new rounds of group testing. From the hardware perspective, the invitation module can be power-gated and disabled when not in use.
Algorithm 5.4. Let the number of honest shareholders in the current group testing be $\Delta t$ and $0 \leq \Delta t < t$. Suppose the system is able to identify an extra set of $t$ honest shareholders from another group. Then these $t$ honest parties can be combined into the current group with the modified group testing matrix of size $(\binom{t}{2}) \times (n + t)$. With this new test pattern, the $\Delta t + t$ honest shareholders can be identified and the rest will be properly labeled as cheaters.

5.6. Numeric Examples

Here we present two illustrative examples to demonstrate the security of the proposed protocol. The first one will be under the passive attack and the second one under the active attack.

Example 5.1. For an Odysseus system equipped with the proposed secret sharing scheme, there are $t$ cheaters who want to stealthily compute the original secret $S$. However, what they can acquire are $E = E(M(K, S))$ and CHL. Without the client’s PUF they are not able to have the response $K$ to CHL. Therefore, $S$ still remains unknown to the $t$ curious cheaters.

For the second example, for simplicity we will not perform the encryption function $ENCC()$ in the EtiM. For the MAC function we will use $AMD()$ since it is able to work with very short vectors. Thus this numeric example will be relatively small and easy to follow.

Example 5.2. In an Odysseus system, there are 7 boards distributed. This system has adopted our proposed secure TSS scheme which is $t$-threshold and $t = 3$. The original secret is a digital signature $S \in GF(2^{12})$ where $S = 001111110000 = 0\times3F0$. The RS decoder in this scheme is constructed under the assumption that there are at most 2 cheaters. However, in the actual scenario there are 4 devices which have been compromised by the cheaters.

Stage 1: Secret Encoding and Share Distribution

The original secret $0\times3F0$ is first encoded by the AMD encoding function $[Eq. 8]$. Using Definition 3.2 we choose $b = 4$ such that the encoding and decoding are over $GF(2^4)$, $m = 1$ such that the random vector has only one symbol, and $g = 3$ such that $S$ is partitioned into 3 symbols $S = (S_0, S_1, S_2)$ where $S_0 = 0\times3, S_1 = 0\timesF$, and $S_2 = 0\times0$. Suppose the dealer has chosen a response from the client’s PUF which is $K = 0\times0006$ whose corresponding challenge is $CHL = 0\timesAAAA$. The original secret will be encoded to an AMD codeword $E = AMD(K, S)$ by:

$$AMD(K, S) = S_0K \oplus S_1K^2 \oplus S_2K^3 = 01L \Rightarrow E = (0\times3F01).$$

Then with the share distribution polynomial:

$$h_i = CHL \oplus a_iD_i \oplus ED_i^2$$

where $a_i = 0\times5555$ is an arbitrarily chosen coefficient and $CHL, a_i, E \in GF(2^{16})$, this encoded secret is shared to seven Odysseus boards with IDs and shares $[D_i : h_i] = [1 : 0\timesC0FE], [2 : 0\timesFC04], [3 : 0\times9650], [4 : 0\timesF8B4], [5 : 0\times65E0], [6 : 0\times591A], [7 : 0\times334E]$.

However, devices $\{3, 4, 6, 7\}$ have been compromised by cheaters and they have collusively selected another secret $\tilde{S} = 0\timesABCD$ and forged another share distribution polynomial:

$$\tilde{h}_i = 0\timesAAAA \oplus 0\times7777D_i \oplus 0\timesABCD \cdot D_i^2.$$

By their IDs, their shares are changed to: $\{3 : 0\times2686\}, \{4 : 0\timesDBAF\}, \{6 : 0\times9A2F\}, \{7 : 0\times4695\}$.

Stage 2: Secret Reconstruction and Verification

Suppose firstly Odysseus devices $\{2, 3, 4\}$ are selected to reconstruct the secret with $\{3\}$ being cheaters. By the secret reconstruction [Eq. 2] the retrieved secret is:

$$\tilde{E} = 0\times5522.$$

The reconstructed secret will be verified by the AMD decoder using $[Eq. 9]$: $AMD(K, \tilde{S}) = AMD(\tilde{K}, \tilde{S})$. Through the computation over $GF(2^4)$ we have the following inequality:

$$AMD(\tilde{K}, \tilde{S}) \neq AMD(K, \tilde{S}) = S_0\tilde{K} \oplus S_1\tilde{K}^2 \oplus S_2\tilde{K}^3.$$  

Thus, cheating is detected and Stage 3 will be initiated under the assumption of $c_{\text{act}} = 2$ cheaters.

Stage 3: Share Error Correction

Under the RS decoder, $n = 3c_{\text{act}} + 1 = 7$ shareholders will be involved and it can correct up to 2 shares using an $(n, 1, d) = (7, 3, 5)$ RS code. However, there is a total number of $c_{\text{act}} = 4$ cheaters $\{3, 4, 6, 7\}$ which is beyond the capability of this RS decoder. Therefore, the protocol moves in its fourth stage upon the failure of error correction.

Stage 4: Group Testing

This stage is designed under the assumption that among all the 7 Odysseus boards from Stage 3, only $t = 3$ are not compromised by cheaters. The group testing matrix $M$ of size $T \times n$ can be constructed with Construction 5.1, where $T = \binom{3}{1} = 35, n = 7$.

To save space $M$ is listed in its transposed form $M^T$:

```

Each test involves 3 boards and the secret retrieved by them is to be verified by $[Eq. 9]$. Since boards $\{1, 2, 5\}$ are not compromised by cheaters, test 7 is the first test with syndrome 0.

Based on the adaptive Algorithm 5.3, $\Delta t = 7$. The system will only need to run the tests of $\{1, 6, 8, 9\}$ whose participants are boards $\{1, 2, j\}$ where $j \in H \setminus I = \{3, 4, 6, 7\}$. Thus only tests $\{8, 9\}$ are left to run. The actual number of implemented tests are then $9 < \Delta t + (n - k) \ll \binom{6}{1} = 35$.

In this way the Odysseus boards which have been hijacked by cheaters are identified as: $\{3, 4, 6, 7\}$. And the properly functional boards $\{1, 2, 5\}$ will be able to retrieve the encoded legal secret $E = 0\times3F01$ and therefore the correct digital signature is $S = 0\times3F0$. ❑
6. Design Evaluation and Automation

In this section we will evaluate the proposed scheme and offer a design automation tool for it.

6.1. Mis-detection Probability

In the previous example the AMD code works over GF(2^4), where the error mis-detection probability is $P_{\text{miss}} = \frac{1}{16}$ in the worst case. To increase the security level one can simply have the protocol work over a larger field. If the system uses HMAC as the MAC() function, then $P_{\text{miss}}$ is a fixed value close to 0. Therefore, we will only test the performance of the AMD() under different block sizes.

In our experiments, $n/3 \leq c_{\text{act}} \leq n - t$. The sizes of the encoded secret $E$ are set to {8, 16, 32, 48, 64, 80, 96, 128} bits which are the cases for most real-world applications. Therefore, the AMD codes are over GF(2^b) fields where $b \in \{2, 4, 8, 12, 16, 20, 24, 32\}$. A comparison is made between the experimental $P_{\text{miss}}$ (under $4 \cdot 2^b$ rounds of attack and defense) and the theoretical $P_{\text{miss}}$.

![Experimental Pmask vs. Theoretical Pmask](Figure 7: The experimental $P_{\text{miss}}$ matches the theoretical upper bound $P_{\text{miss}} = \frac{1}{2^b}$. The experimental results are usually better than the upper bound because [Eq. 9] does not always have $h$ solutions in the finite field. Also when $b \geq 32$ the experiments did not miss a single attack.)

6.2. Hardware and Runtime Overheads

In this subsection we evaluate the complexity of the proposed scheme under $c_{\text{act}} < n/3$ and $n/3 \leq c_{\text{act}} \leq n - t$, and the hardware and runtime overheads between these two settings. The hardware cost is measured on a Xilinx Vertex 7 XC7VX330T FPGA board, while the timing on an Intel® Core™ i7-6700 @ 3.4GHz and 8 GB memory machine running Linux OS.

6.3. Design Automation

Although one can manually make a secret sharing system with PUF on FPGAs, it still involves a good amount of work: writing the HDL code, fixing the routing and placement of PUF’s basic elements, and configuring the bitstream etc. Also with a change of a parameter, the entire system may need to be modified. Therefore we have designed an automation tool which simply takes user’s inputs of four parameters: secret size, security level (for AMD only, HMAC default as 2^128), total number of holders $n$, threshold $t$, and MAC function. In addition, we also provide a PUF automation tool to generate the PUFs based on user specified response and challenge sizes.

In this tool, the system’s HDL codes and PUF’s fixed-routing configuration are pre-written in a folder named “Templates”. The tool will generate the system according to user specified parameters based on the files in this folder. In future demand of any modification of the system, only the templates need to be adjusted, and the generator tool can stay unchanged.

![GUIs for the secret sharing system generator (left) and the PUF generator (right). With this tool any research can generate his/her own customized secret sharing system in a few clicks to assist his/her researches on secret sharing and PUF.](Figure 8: The GUIs for the secret sharing system generator (left) and the PUF generator (right). With this tool any research can generate his/her own customized secret sharing system in a few clicks to assist his/her researches on secret sharing and PUF.)

7. Conclusion

In this paper we have proposed a secure and robust scheme to share confidential information in IoT systems. This scheme uses Threshold Secret Sharing (TSS) to split the information into shares to be kept by all devices in the system. And so the malfunction of a single device will not harm the security of the entire system. In case of a larger number of erroneous or rogue devices, this scheme ensures both the privacy and integrity of that piece of information even when there is a large amount of sophisticated and collusive attackers who have hijacked the devices. It is able to identify all the compromised devices, while still keeping the secret unknown and unforgeable to attackers. In contrast, the previously proposed secure schemes will suffer from the leakage of secrets, forged fake secrets, or even wrong-honest devices. This scheme works in an adaptive manner, that a more powerful and consuming security module will only be activated when the previous modules fail. Therefore the average power consumption is minimized. This scheme also applies to other IoTs with a structure similar to the Odysseus.
References


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